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“IT’S GRACE AND FAVOR, IT’S NOT LAW”: EXTRA-
LEGAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN FOSTER HOMES IN 
CHINA 
Anna High* 
This Article examines the scope, law and norms of foreign-
run foster homes caring for children from Chinese state-run 
orphanages, a previously undocumented social sphere.  Based on 
in-depth field interviews and participant observation, I trace the 
development and expansion of the sector over the last twenty years, 
then examine and analyze the various interactions occurring 
between the foster homes—predominantly run by foreign mission 
workers—and the Chinese state.  It is shown that at the local 
interface between state officials and the foreign foster homes, 
unofficial extra-legal norms are frequently more effectual and 
salient in practice than the official and restrictive rules and policies 
on charities and orphan welfare.  Such extra-legal regulation of the 
sector has resulted in an experience of, at times, uncertainty and 
vulnerability on the part of the foreign humanitarian workers in 
terms of the permissibility and sustainability of their work.  Despite 
this, the sector continues to slowly expand in the shadow of fairly 
well defined informal rules, with social legitimacy rather than 
formal legality functioning as the most important determinant of 
stability in this politically charged field.  Finally, I examine the 
practical ramifications of the extra-legal nature of the foreign 
foster-home and implications thereof for orphan welfare in China 
generally.  The most notable outcomes of this tentative equilibrium 
are an absence of collaborative advocacy efforts, and a sense of 
instability and insecurity on the part of workers in the field.  As a 
result, the ability of this sector of civil society to promote reform 
and improve the welfare of China’s orphaned children is being 
unnecessarily stifled. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Good News Training Centre1 is located in a small village on 
the outskirts of a major Chinese metropolis.  The seventy-odd 
children who live at Good News are all blind or visually impaired.  
They are all formally in the guardianship of various state-run 
orphanages, but have been brought to live at Good News, on a long-
term basis, in order to receive specialist medical care and education.  
The children attend crèche or school classes, and eat meals together, 
in a central building, and live with “house parents” in a row of 
family-sized homes next door.  The grounds of Good News are 
                                                                                                               
 1 For reasons of confidentiality, all identifying names have been changed. 
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expansive and well-tended, and boast gardening beds, horse stables, 
a swimming pool, and a gymnasium.  There is also a large 
apartment that houses a steady stream of volunteers, some Chinese 
but most from overseas, who come to Good News to spend time 
teaching, caregiving, and training. 
Many of the children at Good News are on an adoption 
waiting list.  On my second visit to Good News in 2010, I was 
privileged to witness an adoption party for Teresa, a fourteen-year-
old girl who had lived at Good News since being sent there by her 
home orphanage some six years earlier.  It was Teresa’s “gotcha day” 
(the term is used by adoptive parents to refer to the day on which 
their child is handed into their care) and she had just met her new 
American parents for the first time.  She told me that she felt so 
nervous that she couldn’t say a word to them.  When the party 
began, the children of Good News formed an honor guard at the 
doorway into the playroom, waving balloons, blowing whistles and 
banging toy drums to welcome Teresa and her parents to the party.  
The new family entered and sat in front of a projector screen 
showing a poignant slideshow of pictures from Teresa’s six years at 
Good News.  Then came a video in which various children said their 
farewells—“Goodbye, my sister, don’t forget about us.  We will 
miss you.”  Finally, when the emotions of meeting her parents and 
hearing the messages of love on the video seemed about to 
overwhelm the teenager, the children came one at a time to kneel in 
front of her and say a final goodbye in person.  The intensity of this 
rite of transition from one family to another could keenly be felt in 
the room. 
Teresa’s gotcha day was a visible example of the significant 
role that homes such as Good News play in the lives of orphaned 
and abandoned children across China.  Good News was founded by 
a Christian couple who moved to China from Europe to dedicate 
their lives to the mission of caring for such “lonely children.”2  The 
                                                                                                               
 2 See generally Anna High, China’s Orphan Welfare System: Laws, Policies and 
Filled Gaps, 8(1) U. PA. E. ASIA L. REV. 126, 131–147 (2013) (discussing the 
demographics of vulnerable children in China).  The Chinese word for orphan is gu’er—er 
meaning “child” and gu meaning “solitary, isolated, alone.”  The term better 
accommodates the various life circumstances of the children resident in China’s state and 
private orphanages and foster homes, many of whom have one or both parents living.  It 
should also be noted that the English term “orphan” is experienced by some as pejorative.  
For that reason, I try to use the term sparingly, and it is not my intention to define children 
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home is one of dozens of “foster homes” in China, run by scores of 
Western expatriates—and an increasing number of Chinese 
nationals—who want to support the often overwhelmed and 
underfunded state-run orphanages in their care of disabled and 
special-needs orphans.  During the transitional period following the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), all foreign-run 
missionary orphanages across China were either closed or taken 
over by the state. 3   Today, while the government continues to 
officially monopolize the running of orphanages, 4  this new 
collaborative model of orphan care has spread through major 
municipalities and their surrounding townships.  Children from state 
orphanages are fostered to specialist homes in order to receive 
medical intervention and family-style care, often for years at a time 
until adoption can be arranged or they age out of the system.  The 
homes range from small-scale operations in which a small number 
of children are cared for by a single “mother and father” team, to 
larger homes providing care for hundreds of children with a team of 
caregivers and an emphasis on emulating, as far as possible, a 
traditional family environment. 
This Article is, to this author’s knowledge, the first in-depth 
socio-legal account of the legal and extra-legal regulation of this 
social sphere: the fostering of orphaned children from Chinese state 
institutions to foreign-run welfare homes, homes that are 
predominantly run by expatriate Christians.  Both foreigners and 
religious groups have traditionally been regarded with suspicion by 
Chinese authorities, and their charitable works closely monitored 
and at times interrupted for political reasons.5  The involvement of 
such groups in caring for vulnerable children is yet more politically 
sensitive due to the fact that such activities draw attention to issues 
such as child abandonment (and the related controversy of birth 
planning policies); and shortcomings in the state welfare system—
issues on which China has frequently adopted a defensive posture 
on the international stage.  The complex intersection of these 
                                                                                                               
solely by their orphaned status.  The term is used broadly, to refer to children who are no 
longer cared for by their parents.   
 3 Xiaoyuan Shang, Looking for a Better Way to Care for Children: Cooperation 
Between the State and Civil Society in China, 76(2) SOC. SERVS. REV. 203, 205 (2002). 
 4 Id. at 205; High, supra note 2 (discussing grassroots private quasi-legal orphanages 
that have emerged in response to gaps in state provision of services). 
 5 Civic Freedom Monitor: China, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW (Dec. 5, 
2016), http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/china.html [https://perma.cc/R3RB-HFQS]. 
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various socio-political factors in this area of activity make it a 
valuable case study through which to understand local state-society 
relations generally and the Chinese state’s regulation of foreign-
funded and foreign-operated charitable non-profits specifically. 
Two previous sociological studies have touched upon the 
role of foreign charities in caring for orphaned children in China.  
First, Catherine Keyser’s overview of state and non-state actors 
caring for Chinese orphans briefly introduces three high-profile 
foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working closely 
with state orphanages, two of which are included in the current 
study. 6   She also discusses lower-profile, unregistered foreign 
organizations providing foster care directly, and describes the 
difficulties they face due to their lack of registration. 7   Second, 
Leslie Wang in Outsourced Children: Orphanage Care and 
Adoption in Globalizing China examines assistance offered by 
Western humanitarian workers to Chinese state-run orphanages, 
based on two detailed ethnographic case studies.  Wang argues that 
partnerships between foreigners and state orphanages are taking 
place in an uncertain political context and are thus highly unstable, 
leading Wang to question the limits of such transnational 
collaboration as China continues to globalize.8  This shifting terrain 
is likewise referred to by Keyser, who argues that “political, 
bureaucratic and financial constraints [including] tension over how, 
and under what circumstances, [international] NGOs can be 
registered . . . hamper the legalization of . . . NGOs as full players in 
welfare provision for orphans.”9 
The present study expands and builds on these works by 
exploring the ambiguous legal status of foreign foster homes in 
China and the related question of the legal and extra-legal norms 
that structure this space of order.  I begin in Part II by describing the 
history and current scope of services provided by the foster homes.  
In Part III, I consider laws and policies on charities and orphan 
welfare provision in China, which purport to tightly limit and 
                                                                                                               
 6 Catherine Keyser, The Role of the State and NGOs in Caring for At-Risk Children: 
The Case of Orphan Care, in STATE AND SOCIETY: RESPONSES TO SOCIAL WELFARE NEEDS 
IN CHINA (Jonathan Schwartz & Shawn Shieh eds., 2009). 
 7 Id. 
 8 See generally LESLIE WANG, OUTSOURCED CHILDREN: ORPHANAGE CARE AND 
ADOPTION IN GLOBALIZING CHINA (2016) (exploring the interaction between 
institutionalized children in China and the country’s global rise). 
 9 Keyser, supra note 6, at 62. 
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control the role of non-state organizations and individuals in caring 
for China’s lonely children.  These formal restrictions belie the 
significant contribution of this informal, quasi-legal private sector in 
assisting the state in its care of orphans.  I seek to understand, 
describe, and analyze the extra-legal norms and informal 
interactions with state actors that define the sector, norms which are 
more effectual and salient in practice than formal laws and policies.  
This mode of extra-legal regulation and oversight of the sector has 
resulted in an experience of, at times, uncertainty and vulnerability 
on the part of the foreign welfare workers in terms of the 
permissibility and sustainability of their work.  Despite this, the 
sector continues to slowly expand in the shadow of fairly well 
defined informal rules, with social legitimacy rather than formal 
legality functioning as the most important determinant of stability 
for foreigners working in this politically charged field.  In Part IV, I 
examine the impact this model of extra-legal government 
engagement has for orphan welfare in China, including the 
operational challenges faced by the foster homes in relation to 
organizational finances, administration and advocacy.  The most 
notable outcome of the tentative equilibrium in the field is a 
conspicuous absence of collaboration among the homes or (for the 
most part) between the homes and central authorities; moreover, 
strong motivation and political acumen is needed to succeed in the 
field.  Accordingly, the ability of this sector of civil society to 
promote reform and improve orphan welfare across China is 
apparently somewhat stilted.  
This Article is based on a broader research project 
investigating private orphan welfare providers in China. 10   My 
research is based primarily on interviews undertaken from July to 
October 2009 and July to September 2010 with representatives of 
orphan-related welfare providers in Hebei, Shandong, Henan, 
Shaanxi, Anhui, Shanxi, and Jiangsu provinces, as well as the 
Beijing and Shanghai municipalities. 11   On both research trips, 
                                                                                                               
 10 See Anna High, Grassroots NGO Regulation and China’s Local Legal Culture, 9(2) 
SOCIO-LEGAL REV. 1 (2013); High, China’s Orphan Welfare System, supra note 2.  See 
also Anna High, Government Beyond Law—Exploring Charity Regulation and Spaces of 
Order in China (Dec. 1, 2011) (D. Phil. (Law) thesis, University of Oxford), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2224147 (examining the regulatory 
landscape relating to private orphanages, both foreign and domestically run, in China, and 
the formal and informal relationships between such homes and government). 
 11 See infra Appendix A. 
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approximately half of my time was spent living at various 
orphanages and foster homes, helping out with child-care, 
administrative work, and English lessons, in order to more closely 
observe their operations and daily living.  The subjects of study 
were approached based on personal introductions and snowball 
sampling.  In total, over seventy-five people assisted in this research.  
All interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity.  
Where referenced herein, organizations and place names are 
referred to by pseudonyms. 
II. BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN-RUN FOSTER HOMES 
This section briefly overviews the history and scope of the 
foreign-run foster homes operating in China today.  In-depth 
interviews and follow-ups were carried out at fourteen case study 
homes.  In addition, two Chinese-run homes, both relatively new 
and inspired by the example of the foreign-run foster homes, were 
also included in the study.  I believe that I contacted the majority of 
foreign-run foster homes in China, although there are no reliable 
data on the number of homes in the field.  Accordingly, it is difficult 
to be more definitive on this point.  Many of the homes have 
expertise in providing care for a particular population, as shown in 
the table of case studies below. 
 
Name Specialization 
Prince of Peace Cerebral palsy 
St. Matthew’s Teenage boys 
Compassion House Brittle bones 
Friendship Outreach General surgical/medical 
intervention 
Good News Training 
Centre 
Visual impairments 
New Grace Foundation Birth defects, heart disease and 
palliative care 
Mustard Seed Creations Congenital heart defects 
Beijing International China 
Relief (BICR) 
General surgical/medical 
intervention 
China Orphan Relief General surgical/medical 
intervention 
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Lydia’s House Teenage girls 
Loving Embrace Surgery and home care 
Bethany Care Palliative care 
Shooting Star General surgical/medical 
intervention 
Red Thread Birth defects, especially cleft lip 
and palate 
Mercy Home Infants – Chinese-run foster home 
Mothers’ Arms Infants – Chinese-run foster home 
1. Prince of Peace and the Dongjian Homes 
In the city of Meihua, in northeast China, there is a grand, 
gated entrance to the newest campus of Prince of Peace Children’s 
Village.  All the buildings on this campus are newly constructed, 
clean and beautifully furnished.  In the reception building, a double 
height entrance foyer with granite flooring and wooden paneling is 
lined with framed photos of the hundreds of children who have 
passed through Prince of Peace over the course of its decades-long 
history.  Beyond the foyer and out the double French doors at its 
rear, all seven acres of the campus can be admired.  There are six 
stand-alone “family” homes, a clinic, a preschool, and an 
elementary school, an arts and craft workshop, a community 
outreach center, and a hotel for visitors.  The various buildings are 
connected by paved walkways that weave through landscaped 
ornamental gardens and numerous play areas. 
There are over one hundred and fifty orphaned children 
living at Prince of Peace, with one caregiver on duty for every two 
to three children.  The children were brought here from state 
orphanages across China to be treated for their special medical 
needs.  As Prince of Peace’s reputation for free, specialist medical 
and surgical intervention has spread among orphanage directors, its 
waiting list has grown and new buildings have been built to increase 
its capacity.  More than six hundred children have come and gone, 
most of whom were adopted to Western families as arranged by 
their home orphanages.  Adoptive parents may never find out about 
this grand “village” where their children spent months or years of 
their early lives; according to most adoption dossiers, the children at 
Prince of Peace remain in the care of their home orphanages. 
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Prince of Peace wasn’t always located in Meihua.  The 
organization was founded by an American couple, Robert and Lucy 
Gilbert.  In the 1980s, the Gilberts felt a spiritual calling to begin 
fostering orphaned children from Chinese institutions to provide 
them with family-style care and medical treatment pending adoption 
to “forever families.”  They established a charitable organization in 
America to collect donations to support their mission and began 
bringing foster children from the Meihua state orphanage to stay in 
their own home in a housing estate in a nearby city, Dongjian.  A 
Chinese philanthropist and Dongjian neighbor, Mr Zhao, facilitated 
the foster care arrangements with the Meihua orphanage.  As the 
Gilberts took in more and more children, Mr. Zhao lent them a 
number of houses on the estate to house their continually growing 
foster family. 
Over the years, the Gilberts inspired other like-minded 
expatriate neighbors and church friends, and their model of foster 
care spread to other homes in the same compound.  Laura and Jesse, 
friends of the Gilberts who moved to Dongjian in 1999 to assist 
them in their charitable work, began taking in boys from the Meihua 
orphanage—teenagers with low prospects of adoption and often 
serious behavioral issues.  “They never had a birthday and they 
never had a gift.  They don’t know how to handle it, being here with 
‘parents.’”12  By 2002, there were six foreign-run foster homes in 
the compound, including St Matthew’s, Compassion, Good News, 
and Friendship Outreach. 
Around this time, the Gilberts were anxious to expand their 
mission but were beginning to feel uneasy about their dependence 
on Mr. Zhao’s goodwill.  They began looking for an alternative 
location for their work and struck up a deal with the Meihua city 
authorities.  The government there, apparently with regard to the 
enormous financial benefits of having such a large potential 
employer move into its bounds, sold the Gilberts a large block of 
land for one RMB, or about fifteen cents (the translator dryly 
remarked at the time, “I think you should take it, it’s a good deal.”).  
Following this purchase, the Gilberts began building the sprawling, 
custom-made campus that is now the Prince of Peace Children’s 
Village.  The move was completed in 2006.  The home is now one 
                                                                                                               
 12 Interview with Laura and Jesse, Founders, St Matthew’s Foster Home, in Dongjian, 
China (July 29, 2010). 
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of the largest employers in Meihua, with scores of local Chinese 
women acting as primary caregivers for the residents.  One of the 
conditions of sale was that a certain minimum square footage would 
be constructed on site, a stipulation that ensured many years of 
continued injection into the local economy.  The campus is a source 
of pride for Meihua—police officers often visit with gifts, and the 
Meihua state orphanage brings visitors to Prince of Peace as an 
example of a “model foster home.” 
Back in the Dongjian compound, the number of orphans 
being cared for by foreigners in the area was steadily increasing and 
gaining in notoriety.  Large numbers of volunteers and prospective 
adoptive families were passing through, and all the homes were 
soliciting donations for their work through much-trafficked websites.  
From 2006 to 2007, the Dongjian homes began to experience 
unfavorable attention and escalating pressure from local Ministry of 
Civil Affairs 13  officials and police.  This came in the form of 
surprise “inspections” and frequent phone calls and was mostly 
framed in terms of moving elsewhere rather than shutting down: 
“They were basically just saying: We don’t want this to be our 
problem—go somewhere else.”14  “They didn’t tell us to close, they 
told us to move.  At first, it was friendly, then it became more 
pressured, with constant knocks on the door.”15  It also appears that 
pressure was exerted “upstream” on the Meihua orphanage director, 
as Meihua decided to recall its children from the various Dongjian 
foster homes in 2007, a decision most interviewees attributed to the 
influence of the MCA.  Some of those children had been living in 
Dongjian for years.  “That was heart-breaking—the older kids had 
been there all their lives.  They were seven and eight and nine, this 
                                                                                                               
 13 The Ministry of Civil Affairs (Minzhengbu, hereinafter “MCA”) is the 
administrative authority responsible, inter alia, for welfare programs for marginal groups. 
The central MCA is complemented by MCA bureaus at both the provincial and local level. 
For an overview of the issues confronting the MCA in fulfilling its mandate, see LINDA 
WONG, MARGINALIZATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE IN CHINA 153 (1998) (noting the 
department’s “impossible wide range of duties, their disparate nature, and lack of 
coherence . . . [as factors that are] not conducive to the emergence of agency goals and 
mission” and a “woefully deficient” staffing structure). 
 14 Interview with Alain, Founder, Good News Training Centre, in Hebei, China (Aug. 
24, 2009). 
 15 Interview with Laura and Jesse, Founders, St Matthew’s Foster Home, in Dongjian, 
China (July 29, 2010). 
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was all they knew, suddenly taken to the orphanage.  It must have 
been like getting hit in the face with a two-by-four.”16 
Eventually, the larger, more visible homes, such as Prince of 
Peace and Good News, moved to new locations where they could 
take on more employees and wards; three smaller homes, St. 
Matthew’s, Compassion House, and Friendship Outreach, each of 
which cared for around two dozen wards, were able to lie low and 
stay in Dongjian until the threats and visits eventually abated.  
According to Rebecca, the Chinese manager of Friendship Outreach, 
“that time, the hard time, is over now.”  Jesse of St. Matthew’s 
believes that once the larger homes moved on, the MCA decided the 
compound was “shut enough.”  At the time of my last visit, the 
operators of the three Dongjian homes spoke with general security 
about the future of their work; this was mainly attributed to faith in 
God’s protection.  They were also all careful to avoid interaction 
with local authorities, although local police appeared to be aware of 
their continued presence.  In the years that have passed since the 
crackdown, scores of children have received loving foster care in 
the remaining Dongjian homes, as described by one of the wards of 
Compassion: 
I have scoliosis.  I was abandoned by my family to 
the roadside when I was little.  It was a kind passerby 
who picked me up and took me to the local 
orphanage.  And that’s where I lived for the next 
twenty years. . . . Because I never had parents, I 
didn’t know what family life was, I didn’t know what 
love was.  It was here [at Compassion] that I came to 
know what love is.  It was here that I first had a dad 
and a mom.  They treat me like they do their own 
kids. . . . They are willing to spend time on us, to stay 
beside us, so we know love again.  They know we 
need family. . . . I didn’t just learn love here.  I 
learned forgiveness.  I have forgiven my biological 
dad and mom for abandoning me, because I know 
                                                                                                               
 16 Interview with Laura and Jesse, Founders, St Matthew’s Foster Home, in Dongjian, 
China (July 29, 2010). 
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they knew not what they were doing.  So, I pray for 
them.17 
2. Alternative Care Models 
The broad mission of Prince of Peace and the other foreign-
run homes in the field is to foster orphans from state institutions on 
an informal but often long-term basis.  This is done in order to 
provide surgical intervention or specialized care, with a view to 
improving the child’s quality of life and adoption prospects.  All of 
the case study homes were founded by people who felt a religious 
calling to “look after orphans in their distress.”18  All are relatively 
well-funded by mostly international donors, and as a result are able 
to provide a very high standard of living and quality of medical care 
as compared to the often underfunded state institutions, with 
excellent caregiver-child ratios.  However, the case studies vary 
greatly in terms of size, scope and care models. 
Some of the older and more established homes, such as 
Prince of Peace, Good News, New Grace, and Mustard Seed, 
employ dozens of local caregivers to care for scores or hundreds of 
children in expansive private grounds.  Some, like St. Matthew’s, 
are based in smaller suburban family residences and employ few, if 
any, domestic helpers.  Still others lie somewhere in the middle of 
the spectrum.  For example, Red Thread, founded by a South 
African expatriate, Alana Winterton, is a home that cares for over 
forty-eight babies under the age of three in two one-bedroom high-
story apartments in the middle of Xi’an.  The rooms of Red Thread 
are crowded with various volunteers coming and going, and a small 
staff of paid nannies who assist Alana in caring for her charges. 
Loving Embrace, a Chinese-run organization, uses a 
comparable but slightly different model.  After acquiring children 
from state orphanages and providing for their surgical needs, rather 
than being cared for by hired nannies in a central facility, each child 
is fostered to a foreign expatriate family who is willing to care for 
the child indefinitely, knowing adoption could happen very soon or 
not for some time. 
                                                                                                               
 17 Interview with Joanna, Resident, Compassion, in Dongjian, China (Sept. 1, 2010). 
 18 “Religion that God our Father accepts as pure and faultless is this: to look after 
orphans and widows in their distress and to keep oneself from being polluted by the world.” 
James 1:27 (New International Version). 
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Bethany Care is a slightly unusual case study, in that the 
foster home is located within the grounds of a state orphanage.  
Bethany Care was set up by the founders of New Grace foster home 
in partnership with one of their “sending” orphanages.  The unit 
provides medical and hospice care to infants from the orphanage 
who would be unlikely to survive under normal circumstances, due 
to congenital conditions.  The impressive hospice facility, which 
was constructed on the state orphanage grounds at New Grace’s 
expense, consists of a six-story building with 140 beds, a dental 
clinic, and an operating theatre.  As Bethany’s Chinese campus 
manager wryly put it, “it’s hard to say who it belongs to.” 19  
Bethany’s medical staff and volunteers are employed, trained, and 
supervised by New Grace to provide around-the-clock care and pain 
relief.  While Bethany Care has a more clinical feel than most of the 
other foster homes, even there the children constantly receive 
individual attention, stimulation, and love.  David and Carly Dale, 
founders of New Grace and Bethany Care, currently care for more 
than 300 babies and children across their various facilities, aged 
from a few weeks to five years old.  In 2010, there were 405 new 
admissions, forty-three adoptions, 105 deaths, and 146 
hospitalizations and surgeries.  Their work is funded by the Dales’ 
personal finances and by donations from charities, corporations, and 
individuals overseas, mainly in the United States.  
III. SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT 
OVERSIGHT OF THE SECTOR 
A variety of legal structures and extra-legal strategies are 
used by the foreign-run foster homes to facilitate their work in 
China.  While two of the case studies have succeeded in gaining 
formal registration with China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs as 
charitable enterprises, most are either registered as commercial 
enterprises or operating informally, without legal status—what 
interviewees referred to as “half under the table” or being in a “gray 
area.”  This is consistent with the development of charitable non-
profit organizations in China generally, which researchers note has 
been hampered by restrictions, gaps, and ambiguities in the NGO 
                                                                                                               
 19 Interview with Linda, Director of Bethany Care, in Henan (Sep. 24, 2009). 
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legislative framework. 20   As a result, most Chinese NGOs are 
unregistered21 and experience “unstable legal status.”22 
Existing literature tends to assume that unregistered 
grassroots NGOs “do not encounter too much interference from the 
government” and are not directly controlled by the state in the 
absence of registration,23 there being a supervision gap that allows 
for greater freedom.  However, the current study shows that at the 
local interface between state and society, oversight and control is 
frequently exerted informally.  A combination of government 
oversight and back-turning exists in this regulatory space—widely 
spoken of in China as the “one eye open, one eye closed” approach.  
In this section, I survey the formal registration and certification 
prospects for privately-run foster homes in China, then turn to 
examine the more salient extra-legal norms and local state-society 
interactions and negotiations that impact foreign orphan welfare 
workers in the field. 
1. The Limited Role of Formal Laws and Policies: Pathways to 
Legality 
We’re not really that legal. We’re legal as far as the 
state orphanage is concerned. We have papers.  But 
as far as [the Ministry of] Civil Affairs—are we legal? 
No.  Foreign foster care, it’s such a vague thing.  
Anyway.  So we just keep going.  Well, what’s “legal” 
anyway? [laughing]24 
The foreign foster homes are working in a field the 
permissibility of which is ambiguous at best.  Although there is a 
                                                                                                               
 20 Yuwen Li, Introduction to NGOS IN CHINA AND EUROPE: COMPARISONS AND 
CONTRASTS 2 (Yuwen Li ed., 2011); Junkui Han, International NGOs in China: Current 
Situation, Impacts and Response of the Chinese Government, in NGOS IN CHINA AND 
EUROPE: COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS 23, 49. 
 21 Li, supra note 20, at 3; Civic Freedom Monitor: China, supra note 5 (noting that 
estimates for the number of unregistered non-profit organizations in China range from a 
few hundred thousand to a few million). 
 22 Peifeng Liu, Development of Charities in China Since the Reform and Opening Up, 
in NGOS IN CHINA AND EUROPE: COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS, supra note 20, at 71, 90. 
 23 Xiaoyuang Kang & Hen Heng, Graduated Controls: The State-Society Relationship 
in Contemporary China, 34 MODERN CHINA 36, 48 (2008). 
 24 Interview with Laura and Jesse, Founders, St Matthew’s Foster Home, in Dongjian, 
China (July 29, 2010). 
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State Council regulatory measure that seems to provide a pathway 
for residents, including foreign nationals, to set up foster homes in 
China,25  the measure requires pre-approval from and partnership 
with the provincial-level Ministry of Civil Affairs bureau, 26 
something that none of the foster homes pursued in establishing 
operations.  Instead, the homes generally used a gradual 
“forgiveness rather than permission” strategy, beginning with 
informal home-based care of a small number of foster children with 
arrangements based on good guanxi, or personal connections, with 
state orphanage directors. 27   Over time, as trust and guanxi 
developed, each home’s capacity and scope expanded, sometimes to 
the point where several hundred children were being cared for.  In 
most cases, these wards officially remain under the guardianship of 
their sending orphanage.28  It is not just a matter of children being 
relocated to a nearby facility under the closer supervision of the 
state orphanage.  Most foster homes care for children from distant 
provinces, with little to no ongoing interaction with the home 
orphanage.  Children are frequently taken overseas for surgery, 
often for months or years at a time, or may receive surgery in 
Shanghai, Beijing, or the home itself.  Given the extreme health 
issues experienced by most new arrivals, deaths are not uncommon. 
More generally, while all of the foster homes started out 
without legal personality or status, about half of the homes have 
since looked into formally registering as NGOs under the Chinese 
legislative framework.  However, until very recently,29 there were 
                                                                                                               
 25 Shehui Fuli Jigou Guanli Zanxing Banfa (社会福利机构管理暂行办法) [Social 
Welfare Institutions Administration Interim Measures] (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs, Dec. 30, 1999, effective Dec. 30, 1999) (China). 
 26 Id. art. 15. 
 27 Kang, supra note 23.  The one exception was the operators of St Matthew’s, who 
report that they spent two years attempting to gain permission from the Taiyuan, Shanxi 
MCA to set up a foster home before realizing it “wasn’t going to happen” and moving to 
Dongjian to emulate the Prince of Peace approach. 
 28 Two of the foster homes, Red Thread and Lydia’s House, have signed ongoing 
contracts with a specific state orphanage to act as temporary guardians; it is notable that 
Lydia’s House pays an annual fee of 30,000 RMB as consideration for the arrangement. 
 29 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingwai Fei Zhengfu Zuzhi Jingnei Huodong Guanli 
Fa (中华人民共和国境外非政府组织境内活动管理法 ) [Law on Foreign NGO 
Management] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Congress, Apr. 28, 
2016, effective Jan. 1, 2017) (China).  Permits foreign non-profit organizations to operate 
in China, filling a longstanding gap in Chinese law vis-à-vis foreign NGOs.  However, it 
remains to be seen whether registration under this new law is a feasible pathway to legality 
for foreign NGOs, given that the law restricts religious activity and requires an official 
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no laws or regulations providing for the registration of foreign-run 
NGOs other than as foreign foundations;30 the foundation pathway 
is not apposite for the foster homes, as “foundation” appears to refer 
to groups that disburse charitable funding rather than carry out 
charitable activities directly. 31   Despite this, two of homes—
Shooting Star and New Grace—have succeeded in registering as 
“Representative Offices of a Foreign Foundation” under the Foreign 
Regulations, but only after many years of unregistered operations 
and at times antagonistic relations with local authorities.  Lawyers 
for these two homes each described the process of registration as 
dependent on impressive political ties, as approval is contingent on 
the central MCA agreeing to act as “professional supervising unit” 
(yewu zhuguan danwei).32  According to my informants, and also as 
reported by other researchers, it is exceedingly difficult to gain such 
cooperation from the MCA without influential political connections 
in high places.33  
                                                                                                               
Chinese sponsor.  It is possible, and perhaps likely, given the restrictive spirit of the law 
and experience of the foster homes to date, that it will be very difficult to obtain approval 
under the new law.  See generally Edward Wong, Clampdown in China Restricts 7,000 
Foreign Organizations, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/04/29/world/asia/china-foreign-ngo-law.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/J3FS-BT6F]. 
 30 See Shehui Tuanti Dengji Guanli Tiaoli (社会团体登记管理条例) [Regulation on 
Registration and Administration of Social Organizations] (promulgated by State Council, 
Oct. 25, 1998, effective Feb. 6, 2016), art. 2 (China); Minban Feiqiye Danwei Dengji 
Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli (民办非企业单位登记管理暂行条例) [Interim Regulations on 
Registration Administration of Private Non-enterprise Units] (promulgated by State 
Council, Oct. 25, 1998, effective Oct. 25, 1998), art. 2 (China) (limiting registration of 
“social organizations” and “private non-enterprise units”, the two types of organizations in 
the Chinese NGO legislative framework, to Chinese citizens) [hereinafter PNEU 
Regulation].  See generally, Jillian Ashley & Pengyu He, Opening One Eye and Closing 
the Other: The Legal and Regulatory Environment for “Grassroots” NGOs in China 
Today, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 29, 73; Han, supra note 20, at 49 (noting gaps in the law for 
foreign NGOs). 
 31 Jijinhui Guanli Tiaoli (基金会管理条例) [Regulations on Foundation Management] 
(promulgated by State Council, Mar. 8, 2004, effective June 4, 2004), art. 29 (China), 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=52033&lib=law, [https://perma.cc/D63H-5PL9] 
[hereinafter Foundation Regulation] (limiting Foundation staff and other administrative 
expenditures to 10% of total expenditures). 
 32 Id. § 7 (designating the central MCA as the “professional supervising unit” (yewu 
zhuguan danwei) for representative offices of foreign Foundations and Foundations whose 
legal representative is a non-citizen). 
 33 Keyser, supra note 6, at 54 (reporting that since the enactment of the Foundation 
Regulation in 2004, anecdotally there was a window of only six months in that year during 
which foreign NGO registration applications were accepted by the central MCA); Ashley 
& He, supra note 30, at 75 (noting that the MCA appears to routinely stall review of 
foreign foundation applications); Han, supra note 20, at 49 (noting the lack of meaningful 
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Even apart from these barriers, other provisions lessen the 
utility of the Foundation Regulation for foreign NGOs, including 
very high minimum capital requirements, 34  restrictions on 
expansion,35 and the prohibition on soliciting or accepting donations 
within China.36 
In all, the formal legislative framework for non-profit 
organizations and charitable enterprises is, in a practical sense, 
largely irrelevant to the foreigners operating foster homes in China, 
with formal registration not generally a viable or desirable option.  
This is consistent with the non-profit sector in China generally, 
which for the most part operates outside restrictive formal laws and 
policies on registration and oversight.37  Given the uncertainty of 
their legal status, the interviewees tended to describe their work as 
permitted in practice but technically illegal.  Local and provincial 
level officials frequently refer to their operations as “illegal” or “not 
allowed,” usually on the basis of an assertion that only the 
government can care for Chinese orphans.  The one state orphanage 
director who was willing to be interviewed denied knowledge of 
any foreign-run foster homes, despite the fact that other foster 
homes interviewed were caring for dozens of children from his 
facility. 38   From a political perspective, this opacity and 
disapprobation is unsurprising, given that the sector involves an 
                                                                                                               
registration prospects for NGOs generally); Interview with Mr. Yang, Director, Shandong 
Charity Federation, in Shandong, China (Sept. 21, 2009) (admitting that registration 
prospects are essentially dependent on having “a close relationship with government.”). 
 34 Foundation Regulation, supra note 31, art. 8. 
 35 Foundation Regulation, supra note 31, art. 12. 
 36 Foundation Regulation, supra note 31, art. 25.  See generally, Li, supra note 20, at 
2 (characterizing the current Chinese NGO legislative framework as restrictive and 
controlling in nature). 
 37 See Han, supra note 20, at 49 (noting gaps in the law for foreign NGOS and a lack 
of meaningful registration prospects for NGOs generally, such that the Chinese NGO 
framework is in practice ineffectual and marginalized); see also Ashley & He, supra note 
30, at 32 (noting that due to barriers to obtaining formal recognition and legal status, “most 
independent NGOs thus operate outside the supervisory gazes of sponsoring agencies and 
the MCA in various quasi-legal states”); JONATHAN SCHWARTZ & SHAWN SHIEH, STATE 
AND SOCIETY: RESPONSES TO SOCIAL WELFARE NEEDS IN CHINA 15 (2009) (noting that 
China’s restrictive NGO regulation has been ineffective and has “deterred many NGOs 
from registering and driven them into an informal sector where they operate as businesses 
or as unregistered NGOs.”). 
 38 Interview with Mr. Wang, Director, Hedong City State Welfare Institute, in 
Shandong, China (Sept. 21, 2009). 
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intersection of such sensitive issues as abandonment, child welfare, 
and foreign/church-affiliated humanitarian relief. 
2. Extra-Legal Regulation: Pathways to Legitimacy 
The majority of the case study homes are not registered 
domestically as charities, and accordingly either operate without 
legal personality or use the legally dubious but common method of 
registering as commercial enterprises.39  Accordingly, they function 
outside of the restrictive and ambiguous formal legal framework for 
NGOs, charities, and orphan welfare.  In relation to such quasi-legal 
NGOs more generally, Ashley and He report that this is a “situation 
which the state is aware of and which it variously cracks down upon, 
tolerates, or even encourages by partnering with those organizations, 
when useful to state ends.”40  This was evident in the field, where 
the general sense was that local authorities take a “one eye open, 
one eye closed” approach to foreigners involved in the provision of 
care to orphaned children.  While the majority of the case study 
homes intentionally seek to maintain low visibility in China, almost 
all have at least some dealings with local state officials (it is 
generally not possible for a home with more than a dozen or so 
children to operate completely under the radar vis-à-vis local, or 
indeed central, authorities).  However, such interactions are usually 
not governed by formal laws and regulations.  Rather, the ability of 
foreigners in the sector to carry on their work and successfully 
negotiate with the state at the local level seems to depend more on 
their accrued legitimacy, in the eyes of the state, than on the legality 
of their work.  To put it another way, it appears that legal 
legitimacy—in the sense of being in compliance with legal rules—is 
                                                                                                               
 39 See infra note 72 and accompanying text.  One exception is Bethany Care, whose 
expatriate founders/managers chose to entrust a Chinese friend to register the home as a 
“Private Non-Enterprise Unit” (minban fei qiye danwei), a type of formal Chinese NGO. 
PNEU Regulation, supra note 30.  Note that since promulgation of the new Charity Law in 
2016, PNEU are now known as “social service organizations” (shehui fuwu jigou), and in 
this way obtain status as a domestic NGO and bypass the lacuna for foreign-run NGOs. 
Cishan Fa (慈善法) [Charity Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 16, 2016, effective, Sept. 1, 2016), translated in http://en.pkulaw.cn/
display.aspx?id=21807&lib=law [https://perma.cc/D7SD-K4Y8].  The risk of such an 
arrangement is that the foreign founders’ “ownership” and control of Bethany is not legally 
enforceable, meaning they could lose their directorship and control over the home if the 
Chinese legal representative were to choose to exercise independence. 
 40 Ashley & He, supra note 30, at 132. 
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not of central importance here.41  As explored below, foreigners in 
the field tend to depend on other types of legitimacy—political, 
administrative, and social—that are not contingent on their 
compliance with (vague and restrictive) legal rules,42 a finding that 
is consistent with the general emphasis in Chinese NGO scholarship 
on legitimacy as the touchstone for stability.43 
Many interviewees were fairly confident about their ability 
to continue operating quasi-legally, without state interference, 
because of the political and social significance of their contributions 
to the state orphan welfare system and local economies alike, 
contributions for which local authorities appear to receive political 
credit within the state apparatus (“this all accrues to the unspoken 
economy in the Party”)44 and which bolster community support for 
foreign foster care.  Surgical intervention provided by the foster 
homes often results in children becoming “adoptable” who were 
previously destined to live out their childhoods in state facilities at 
the state’s expense.  Private foster homes with large operating 
budgets met by private donors bring large influxes of capital and 
increased employment opportunities to local communities.  On the 
other hand, the foster homes also emphasized the political risks to 
local officials and state orphanage directors involved in “closing an 
eye” to the “illegal” nature of the work occurring in the foster 
homes.  As a result, a network of informal, unspoken, extra-legal 
norms are at play in negotiations with the state.  As discussed in this 
                                                                                                               
 41 There are, however, many practical inconveniences associated with the lack of 
legal legitimacy, discussed below in Section IV. 
 42 Han, supra note 20, at 35 (citing Gao Bingzhong, The Question of Legitimacy of 
Social Organizations, in CHINA SOCIAL SCIENCES 2 (2000), dividing legitimacy into four-
part typology: legal [recognition and formalization through legal institutions]; political 
[relating to political correctness of an organization’s agenda and actions]; social [relating 
to congruence with the expectations and norms of society] and administrative [involving 
recognition/acceptance by a bureaucratic system]).  Note that in Chinese, “legitimacy” can 
be translated as heli (a broad concept meaning compliance with truth/reason) or hefa 
(narrower concept denoting compliance with law). 
 43 See, e.g., Han, supra note 20, at 35 (arguing that for international NGOs, due to 
gaps in the current legal landscape, political legitimacy is the precondition for their 
existence in China); Xie Haiding, Public Interest Legal Organizations in China, in NGOS 
IN CHINA AND EUROPE: COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS, supra note 20, 117, 136 (arguing 
that where legislative provisions are vague, political correctness is the “guiding doctrine in 
selective law enforcement and selective administration of justice.”). 
 44 Interview with Will Peters, Founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009).  See also Interview with Co-founders/Directors, Loving Embrace, in 
Shanghai, China (Oct. 8, 2009). 
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section, compliance with those norms, as well as the ability to 
negotiate protective guanxi or relationships, is key to legitimacy, 
longevity, and security in the sector and has a significant impact on 
local state-society dynamics. 
i. Rules of the Game 
”Foreign orphanages fly in the face of their sense of 
pride and control”.45 
At the local level, interactions with state authorities—such 
as township leaders, local MCA officials, and local police—tend to 
take the form of unannounced visits and drop-ins, occasionally 
involving subtle or clear threats that are variously referred to by the 
recipients as “awkward hints,” “being told off,” or “scoldings.”  The 
level of interest and tolerance of the officials of a particular area 
also appears to depend largely on location and on the number of 
other foster homes operating in the area (presumably because it 
would be easier for local officials to claim lack of knowledge, if 
called to account by their superiors, in relation to one or two foster 
homes than in relation to half a dozen).  Rarely are there outright 
threats to completely shut down a home’s operations, and rarely are 
such threats followed through—whether because government tacitly 
approves of private orphan welfare work or for other reasons, such 
as an unwillingness to draw negative publicity, or the inability to 
care for the children themselves were the homes to be shut down.  It 
is much more common for a foster home to be asked to leave a 
particular administrative region (an observation which accords with 
the decentralized and fragmented nature of Chinese regulatory 
bureaucracy), or for a period of scolding to simply peter out in time. 
In terms of negotiating these interactions, the interviewees 
expressed a very clear understanding, whether tacitly or explicitly, 
of the informal rules that govern their relationships with state 
orphanages and officials at this local level.  Broadly, these informal 
norms seemed to relate to two state concerns: first, to be assuaged of 
fears of subversive intentions on the part of foreigners; and second, 
to prevent a loss of face, 46  domestically and internationally, 
                                                                                                               
 45 Interview with Austin, Lawyer, New Grace, in Beijing, China (July 7, 2010). 
 46 For a useful outline of the place and importance of face in Chinese culture, see 
Hsien Chin Hu, The Chinese Concepts of “Face”, 46(1) AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 45 (1944) 
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resulting from a proliferation of foreigners conspicuously caring for 
Chinese babies.  It is these rules, rather than law and policy in a 
narrower sense, that largely determine the security and sustainability 
of foreign foster homes and govern the varying degrees of 
engagement occurring between different faces of the state and 
society. 
First, operators spoke of the need to assuage “government 
fears” of subversive intentions of charitable workers.  Many 
interviewees spoke of how poorly received their charitable efforts 
are in China, and of experiencing ridicule or even strident objections 
to the idea of helping strangers without personal benefit or hidden 
motives.  For example, a common accusation levelled against males 
in the field is that they have illegitimately fathered the children in 
their care or intend to sell the children to foreign friends.  
Additionally, people with strong religious motivation and 
affiliations run all the homes, and almost all receive significant 
financial support from Western donors, primarily in the United 
States—both factors that typically draw wary scrutiny in China.  
Accordingly, transparency and openness was generally considered 
very important when dealing with local police and MCA officials 
and village leaders, and all interviewees had very strict rules against 
proselytism by staff and volunteers in their neighborhoods (although 
most were very open within their walls and with visitors, Chinese 
and foreign alike, about their religious motivations). 
Secondly, there was a strong norm among all operators of 
avoiding any behavior that could potentially draw attention, 
domestically or internationally, to the disparity between official 
government policy on the care of orphans, and the reality of the 
wealth of foreigners caring for children still technically in the 
guardianship of the state. As one (Chinese) interviewee described 
the dynamic: 
Orphanages are very emotive.  Orphans are the most 
vulnerable people in China, and it’s easy to see that 
public opinion could be very positive or negative.  If 
something went wrong, it could be very, very 
negative—”What’s the Chinese government doing 
                                                                                                               
(explaining the importance of maintaining credibility and a good reputation in public in the 
Chinese culture). 
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giving our kids to some foreigners?  Why can’t we 
take care of our own kids?” . . . Any self-respecting 
country may have a problem explaining to its people 
why we cannot take care of our own kids. 47 
While many were candid with me about their concerns over 
the quality of care in state orphanages, all interviewees were keenly 
aware of the risks associated with embarrassing China through 
publicity about their mission to improve state care for orphaned 
children: “They worry that we’re going to embarrass China by what 
we’re doing, on an international basis, by showing the world that 
China is not doing its job looking after its children.”48  The homes 
recognized that in order to be able to stay in the game, it was 
important to contribute to government “face” by helping maintain 
the impression, domestically and internationally, that Chinese state 
orphanages are not in dire need of assistance: “I live in a twilight 
zone between the reality of what it is, and what I have to portray it 
to be.”49  In this vein, Mustard Seed Creations expressed relief that 
their reputation is now sufficiently well established that they no 
longer need to approach the state orphanages with offers of help, 
because “if they request help [from us], it feels like they’re more 
choosing to get help from us, not us helping them.”50  Private foster 
home websites tend to refer to “partnerships with the Chinese 
government” or the “best efforts” being made by China to care for 
its orphans, and domestic fundraising efforts (if any) by foreigners 
in the field are generally done quietly—“We don’t want the 
community to think the orphanage is not caring for their children. 
We don’t want to bring them any shame, only positive 
recognition.”51  When Alana of Red Thread referred in her blog to a 
healthy former ward who had died on returning to a state orphanage, 
she was immediately subjected to days of government visits and 
                                                                                                               
 47 Interview with Austin, Lawyer, New Grace, in Beijing, China (July 7, 2010). 
 48 Interview with Will Peters, Founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
 49 Interview with Alana, Founder/Director, Red Thread, in Shaanxi, China (Sep. 27, 
2009). 
 50 Interview with Manager, Mustard Seed Creations, in Beijing, China (Aug. 11, 
2010). 
 51 Interview with Volunteer Coordinator, Wuzhong Child Welfare Institute, in Jiangsu, 
China (Oct. 9, 2009). 
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threats that her home would be shut down; “I can understand why; I 
embarrassed them.”52 
This issue of pride is an important reason behind the use of 
Chinese staff as primary caregivers in all of the homes, with 
Western volunteers and employees restricted to assisting the core 
Chinese staff or providing medical assistance on a short-term basis: 
It’s always a trust issue.  We’ve been told by our 
officials here [in town] that they’ll never trust 
foreigners.  No matter what you do, they always 
think you have an ulterior motive.  That you’re using 
the children to make money.  This is another reason 
why we’re very clear that foreigners don’t receive 
salary . . . The Chinese staff have the ultimate say on 
decisions here, the final decisions.  We get consensus, 
not majority decisions.  The staff make a big point of 
that to visitors, and that we don’t receive salaries.53 
Because of the no-no of having foreigners care for 
kids, using American house parents would raise all 
sorts of issues.  But as it is, when the MCA come, 
they see that every face caring for kids is Chinese . . . 
We’re saving them from abandonment, not from 
being Chinese. 54 
Both Mustard Seed and Prince of Peace also noted that their 
employment of Chinese caregivers is an intentional part of a broader 
strategy of localization, which provides short-term protection 
against the common complaint from society and government alike 
that “China doesn’t need foreigners to look after its children,” and 
long-term protection for the continuity of the foster home’s mission 
in the event that foreign founders and managers are asked or forced 
by circumstances to leave China.  “Our goal is that if we were 
kicked out, this could all continue.  You have to hold everything 
                                                                                                               
 52 Interview with Alana, Founder/Director, Red Thread, in Shaanxi, China (Sep. 27, 
2009). 
 53 Interview with Manager, Mustard Seed Creations, in Beijing, China (Aug. 11, 
2010). 
 54 Interview with CEO, Prince of Peace, in Meihua, Hebei Province, China (Sep. 1, 
2009). 
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lightly.  Things change.  You always keep in the back of your mind 
that we very well one day may not be here.” 55   All of the 
interviewees were slow to criticize the quality of care in the state 
system.  There was a conspicuously collaborative and supportive 
tenor to orphanage-foster home relationships, which is not say that 
the interviewees were not genuine in their apparent sympathy for 
the underfunded, overworked state system, but rather to note that 
“China-bashing” was noticeably absent in the field, which some 
acknowledged as an important reason their work is allowed to 
continue. 
These rules of the game are just as relevant to cultivating 
trust between foster homes and state orphanages: 
It’s always a risk; the state orphanages are walking a 
fine line, a tightrope—because the MCA doesn’t 
trust foreigners.  So we sort of bow to the state 
orphanages, and how they want to do it—if they 
want us to come to dinners with officials, or if they 
want us to not be visible.  It all depends on their 
relationship with the MCA. 56 
Many state orphanages take great care to keep any 
arrangements with foreign foster homes under the radar.  For 
example, it is often not disclosed to new adoptive parents that their 
child has been in the care of a foster home, which a number of 
interviewees believe is because “they don’t want to admit that they 
sent their kids away to be dealt with by foreigners.”57  Foster homes 
commonly try to include clues in adoption dossier paperwork to 
help new parents track down their child’s history after leaving 
China, with varying levels of success; the implications of this 
imposition of a truncated history on adopted children, for whom 
history and identity are very often repressed or compromised to a 
harmful extent anyway,58 should not be overlooked. 
                                                                                                               
 55 Interview with Manager, Mustard Seed Creations, in Beijing, China (Aug. 11, 
2010). 
 56 Interview with Manager, Mustard Seed Creations, in Beijing, China (Aug. 11, 
2010). 
 57 Interview with CEO, Prince of Peace, in Meihua, Hebei Province, China (Sep. 1, 
2009). 
 58 BARBARA YNGVESSON, BELONGING IN AN ADOPTED WORLD 174–76 (2010). 
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Informal fostering arrangements are only possible when the 
foster home has built up for itself a good reputation as a caregiver 
(“our standard of work gives them a bit of safety”) 59  and has 
demonstrated that it will abide by the unspoken rules of the 
relationship.  When those rules are breached—for example when a 
foreign foster home casts a bad light on state orphanages through 
unfavorable comments in newsletters or blogs—a common response 
is for children to be taken back to their home orphanages, 
sometimes with tragic consequences.60  As one interviewee put it: 
“The kids are not ours.  At any moment, they can take the kids back, 
and they have done in the past.”61  Overall, interviewees expressed a 
keen awareness of the need to “give face” to state orphanages in 
order to maintain rapport and stable foster arrangements: “We don’t 
want to tell the orphanages what to do—we try to do what they feel 
comfortable with.”62 
ii. Friends in High Places 
Many of the case studies have deliberately cultivated 
“umbrella arrangements” or protective informal social or political 
partnerships, such as with influential local figures, government-
organized NGOs, 63  state orphanages, or other NGOs.  Such 
partnerships are seen as bolstering legitimacy and providing some 
measure of protection against government charges of illegality or 
stepping out of line: “You need somebody somewhere willing to say, 
                                                                                                               
 59 Interview with David, Founder/Director, New Grace, in Beijing, China (Aug. 24, 
2010). 
 60 Interview with Alain, supra note 14; Interview with Will Peters, supra note 44; 
Interview with David, supra note 59 (all reporting deaths on return of a child to sending 
orphanage). 
 61 Interview with Founder/Director, BICR, in Beijing, China (Aug. 27, 2009). 
 62 Interview with PR Officer, Mustard Seed Creations, in Beijing, China (Aug. 21, 
2009). 
 63 GONGOs, also known as “officially organized NGOs” as compared to “popular 
NGOs” are “citizen-led efforts from organizations that are nominally independent, but in 
fact are often established by and retain close ties with the state.”  Ashley and He, supra 
note 30, at 32.  Usually registered as Social Organizations, GONGOs are commonly 
referred to as a type of NGO, but may not meet Salamon’s internationally accepted 
definition of an NGO, in particular the requirements of voluntariness and self-government.  
See Lester Salamon & Helmut Anheier, In Search of the Non-profit Sector I: The Question 
of Definitions, 3(2) VOLUNTAS 125, 125 (1992) (defining non-profit sector organizations as 
formal, private, non-profit-distributing, self-governing and voluntary). 
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‘I know that guy—he won’t give you any trouble.’”64  For example, 
the Dales of New Grace believe a major reason they have not been 
hassled more often by local officials is because of the prominent 
display, in their foyer, of a letter from Tung Chee-hwa, former 
governor of Hong Kong, commending “the people of [New Grace’s 
township] for their work in caring for orphans.” 
Similarly, in response to the escalating local pressure in the 
Dongjian compound, both Good News and Prince of Peace decided 
to seek protection and security (in case of future such incidents) by 
relocating and forming partnerships and guanxi with different 
Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations 
(GONGO) and the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) departments, 
instead of keeping a low profile as three other orphanages in the 
area did.  Alain moved Good News to the safety of a town in a 
different province in which no other foreigners, let alone foster 
homes, were located,65 and began to construct new facilities tailored 
to the needs of his vision-impaired wards.  He has also developed a 
relationship with a GONGO, the China Association for Social Work 
(CASW), which he describes as a type of insurance against low-
level interference in the new township: “Sooner or later we will 
need to meet them [local MCA], or the higher authorities will say to 
them, ‘who are these guys?’  Right now, it’s only the police who 
really care about what we’re doing.  If we can get registration [with 
the CASW] at the central MCA level, well we’ll be above those 
guys.”66 
Bethany Care similarly benefits from its partnership with a 
state orphanage.  Its newly-constructed building is on a state-owned 
orphanage lot.  By all appearances, the work done within has been 
appropriated by the state orphanage itself (although David and Carly, 
as directors in absence, retain independence in practice), and credit 
for the institution’s work is often taken by the state orphanage 
bureaucracy: “They get a pat on the back for it—it’s a star in 
                                                                                                               
 64 Interview with Will Peters, Founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
 65 Interview with Founder/Director, BICR, in Beijing, China (Aug. 27, 2009) 
(choosing a location where no other foster homes were located because, in locations like 
Dongjian, “the local authorities know too much.”). 
 66 Interview with Alain, founder of Good News Training Centre, in Hebei (Aug. 24, 
2009). 
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Director Pei’s crown.”67  These examples illustrate the most obvious 
incentive for government agencies in such partnerships and guanxi 
with foreign foster homes—the appropriation of political credit for 
palatial new child welfare homes without any expenditure of time or 
money.  In fact, most sending orphanages still receive per capita 
state funding even for wards that are residing at the foster homes.  
On the other hand, government departments bear a clear risk of such 
arrangements, especially at the local and provincial level, in the 
event something goes wrong.  As David put it, “if it’s done well, it’s 
a big plus . . . The risk is if they work with an organization that 
doesn’t do it well.”68  Therefore, such guanxi can generally only be 
cultivated after years of problem-free operations, in line with the 
informal rules relating to pride and suspicion and demonstrated 
excellence in foster care. 
Other interviewees spoke of the potential costs of seeking 
closer associations with government and GONGO entities.  As Ellie 
at Compassion put it: “We’ve never registered.  We just don’t want 
to be under the government’s thumb, telling us as to what we can 
and can’t do.  [Registration would mean] they get to decide where 
the money is spent.  We don’t want to give them that control.”69  
China Orphan Relief is a case in point.  Until 2009, the foster home 
was operating as a non-entity in China.  However, its operations 
were extensive, with around 400 children being cared for in seven 
locations.  According to its former director, Will Peters, an 
American businessman now living in China, the inconvenience of 
China Orphan Relief’s lack of registration became problematic: 
“We reached a point where if we could clearly see long-term 
sustainability, we needed to change our operation.”70  Faced with a 
choice between seeking registration or formalizing the COR’s 
interaction with orphanage or MCA officials, Will decided instead 
to partner with an already-registered NGO, Shooting Star, believing 
that the benefits of registration would not have outweighed the 
                                                                                                               
 67 Interview with David, founder and director of New Grace, in Beijing (Sep. 17, 
2009). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Interview with Elie, Manager, Mustard Seed Creations, in Beijing, China (Aug. 11, 
2010). 
 70 Interview with Will Peters, founder/CEO of China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
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burdens thereof.  When pushed on what those burdens were, Will 
responded: 
Burdens? You have to play ball, which costs money 
and eats resources, and you can’t make decisions 
solely on what you think is best for the organization.  
So, you get caught up in government’s planning and 
priorities . . . You get sucked into all the vicissitudes 
of the Chinese political system.  I just want to be 
little [in size of operations] and take care of kids.71 
A related protective strategy is to register as a commercial 
enterprise with the State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC).  Registration of a charitable enterprise as a commercial 
entity is clearly incongruous, but reportedly very common in 
China.72  Three of the foster homes have registered representative 
offices of overseas entities with the SAIC and received licenses in 
their efforts to “encourage tourism, commerce and investment in 
China,” to carry on as “consultants for visual impairment 
equipment,” and to conduct “market research relating to orphanage 
and rest home equipment,” respectively.  Commercial registration is 
often more convenient than acting as a non-entity and provides 
some measure of “quasi-administrative legitimacy,” 73  in that the 
foster home is given a legal personality and some state recognition; 
on the other hand, such organizations are clearly acting outside the 
mandate of their SAIC licenses.  The SAIC is aware of the trend for 
foreign NGOs to register as a business entity in China, and at 
various times, it has issued new directives limiting the number and 
variation of the organizations’ names that can be used by 
representative offices “in a bid to prompt NGOs sailing under a 
business flag of convenience to re-register with the [MCA].”74  
Rather than prompting deregistration, these “name change” 
rules have simply led to creative circumvention.  New Grace’s 
overseas charity name, in Chinese, includes the word “jijinhui” 
                                                                                                               
 71 Interview with Will Peters, Founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
 72 Civic Freedom Monitor: China, supra note 21. 
 73 Han, supra note 20, at 35. 
 74 Tina Qian & Nick Young, Rule on Names Starts to Close Door to NGO 
“Businesses”, CHINA DEV. BRIEF (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/
node/74 (on file with author). 
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(foundation)—they changed this to “fendashen,” an alliteration of 
the English equivalent, in order to avoid scrutiny by the SAIC when 
their license is renewed.75  Good News has removed “foster home” 
from its name, becoming instead a “training center,” and has opened 
both a business and a charity in Hong Kong (Good News China Ltd. 
and Good News China Foundation Ltd., respectively).   This 
strategy has allowed them to register a representative office of the 
former with the SAIC while using the existence of the latter 
associated organization to argue with the Chinese tax department 
that the representative office should not be taxed.76 
 
iii. Negotiated Relations with Local States 
 
Despite the friends in high places that some foster homes 
have cultivated over the years, most of the homes still interact 
exclusively with local-level officials, and there is a general sense of 
reliance on their goodwill: “It all depends on who is in charge of 
your county—if he doesn’t care, then you’ll have no problems.”77  
Good News explained their sense of being at the mercy of local 
leaders when seeking to construct new buildings on their premises: 
All we could do was ask the village chief for 
permission.  He said yes, and scribbled something on 
a piece of paper, but legally he has no authority to 
approve this.  If the government were to 
compulsorily acquire our land, well, we would need 
to rely on the village chief’s connections with the 
provincial authorities for protection.  But we’ve 
never paid bribes to him, unlike our landlord, who 
owns the main building.  [Our landlord] would be 
O.K., because he has cultivated good governance 
[through paying bribes].  So, do we play his game, 
and get some protection, or risk losing everything?  
Some things are just culturally accepted here; they’re 
part of the customs.  But you don’t want to do 
                                                                                                               
 75 Interview with David, founder and director of New Grace, in Beijing, China (Aug. 
24, 2010). 
 76 Interview with Alain, Founder, Good News Training Centre, in Hebei, China (Aug. 
20, 2010). 
 77 Id. 
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something you don’t feel 100% comfortable with or 
cannot be morally accountable for.  [Pause].  You 
can’t win this war!78 
Many interviewees felt that, despite being often threatened 
by officials with closure or legal action because of the antipathy 
toward foreigners looking after Chinese babies and because such 
homes are considered illegal, the chance of such threats being 
carried through was slim.  Rather, the frequent threats or scolding 
received by foster homes may be more a way for government to 
maintain face and demonstrate power, rather than any genuine 
attempt to have the law on the books enforced.  For example, Ellie 
of Compassion told me that her (American) family’s passports and 
papers were once held by local police for a week without apparent 
reason, which in her view was “just to prove that they could.  It was 
just to prove that they really are in control . . . But they know what 
we’re doing is good work, as long as we don’t cross that line.”79 
I witnessed a number of threatening but blustering incidents 
during my stay at New Grace Foundation.  On one occasion, David 
asked me to come upstairs and translate an apparently very heated 
argument going on between a man from the town offices and the 
home’s Chinese staff manager.  He was irate that one of New 
Grace’s nannies had been fired for striking a child, something that 
all staff are forbidden to do as a condition of employment.  He had 
come in to demand her reinstatement.  The staff manager humbly 
acknowledged his concerns, before sending him next door to drink 
baijiu (Chinese liquor) with the male chef and drivers.  Austin, New 
Grace’s lawyer, also recounted an incident in which a local 
government issued a warning that the main foster home building at 
New Grace would be imminently demolished because it had been 
constructed in an industrial zone without planning permission.80  At 
the time of construction, there had been no way to apply for a 
zoning change because the foster home was not certified, and the 
buildings were built without the permit.  Some years later, the 
demolition notice arrived: “We panicked, we thought the bulldozers 
                                                                                                               
 78 Interview with Alain, Founder, Good News Training Centre, in Hebei, China (Aug. 
20, 2010). 
 79 Interview with Co-founders/Directors, Compassion, in Dongjian, China (Sept. 1, 
2009). 
 80 Interview with Austin, Lawyer, New Grace, in Beijing, China (Sept. 5, 2009). 
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were coming down the road.”81  When Austin went to visit town 
officials to make an appeal, he was greeted with a barrage of threats 
and accusations of illegality (in relation to caring for orphans).  He 
also said he knew, so long as he humbly received the telling off, that 
the threats would not be carried out: “I know enough about China to 
keep quiet and be humble.”82  Eventually, the whole issue about the 
land use “just went away.”83 
Conversely, the homes report that there are also times that 
visiting officials express approval of these unregulated operations.  
This can be implied (through not following through with threats) or 
expressed.  For example, New Grace had an incident when village 
officials arrived for an unannounced visit to require all nannies at 
the home pass an exam to become qualified caregivers.  When 
David expressed skepticism that his employees, most of whom are 
also farmers, would have time to study for the exam, he was given 
an answer sheet to distribute to the candidates.84 
More astute and experienced foster home operators are 
extremely adept at playing by the rules and negotiating the “game” 
at the local level, to the point where they may be comfortable 
calling the government’s bluff when threatened.  For example, Will 
Peters of China Orphan Relief spoke extensively of his strategies for 
negotiating with state officials: 
When you talk about the Chinese government, what 
does that mean?  The government is a big, huge 
statement.  You can be in one office and say “they 
[another department] said I could do this”—you’re 
deliberately setting up a rivalry.  So, our tactic is to 
threaten to split the different bureaus against each 
other . . . It boils down to a very serious game of 
poker.  I make threats, and they have to decide 
whether I am bluffing or not and whether calling my 
                                                                                                               
 81 Interview with David, Founder/Director, New Grace, in Beijing, China (Sept. 17, 
2009). 
 82 Interview with Austin, Lawyer, New Grace, in Beijing, China (Sept. 5, 2009). 
 83 Interview with David, Founder/Director, New Grace, in Beijing, China (Sept. 17, 
2009). 
 84 Id. 
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bluff is worth the risk . . . it’s not pleasant, but it’s for 
a good cause and even they know it.85 
When China Orphan Relief began to experience similar 
pressure to the Dongjian homes to relocate, Will’s response was 
neither to lie low nor move: 
They clearly didn’t think they had the political might 
to shut us down, but they told us we had to move, 
listing a litany of violations.  My response was this: 
“Everything you said is true.  You can decide to try 
to make me move.  We all know that if you do that, 
your supervisors will find out.  And you don’t know 
who I know in the Beijing government.  So, there is a 
risk to you.  For me to ignore you is also a risk.  We 
have to work something out. I’m doing a good thing 
for China.  How can we do this so none of us 
loses?”86 
Austin, New Grace’s Chinese lawyer, expressed similar 
ideas, including the need to allow but also create opportunities for 
local officials to scold and berate, in order to “give face,” accrue 
social capital and be able to push boundaries further in the future.  
He explained the game as follows: 
It’s an art, a very difficult art.  It depends on a few 
factors in my view.  First, it depends on who you 
know.  Second, whatever you want to ask him to do 
must be permissible or encouraged.  To ask someone 
to bend the rules for you is harder, because they have 
to expend their social or political capital.  Third, 
there should be some benefit to them—can you do a 
favor to him in return, help out his family somehow.  
If it is something which can help him in his job, he’ll 
be more likely to help.  And the fourth factor is 
                                                                                                               
 85 Interview with Will Peters, Founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
 86 Id. 
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whether you are critical of the government, or in any 
way negative against the government. 87 
Some interviewees were clearly capable of taking advantage 
of opportunities to build on such trust and rapport with local 
officials, with beneficial outcomes for their children.  For example, 
China Orphan Relief has occasionally been able to have a child’s 
hukou88  record of birth date or birth place amended to increase 
adoption prospects: “Over time, you play on this trust and ask them 
to take new risks—a new type of trust develops, and a tighter 
bond.” 89   Other areas where the foster homes felt comfortable 
pushing for further leeway and “closed eyes” were in relation to 
soliciting donations in China (which is illegal for unregistered 
charities), taxation rates, and administrative laws relating to land use. 
IV. OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE “ONE EYE 
OPEN” APPROACH TO FOREIGN FOSTER HOMES 
The case study homes varied greatly in terms of concern 
about operating without formal recognition or legal status.  As noted 
above, only about half had investigated the possibility of formal 
NGO registration.  Some interviewees expressed concern that 
legalization and the attendant formal government oversight would 
hinder their independence.  However, as introduced in this section, 
most of the homes had encountered various practical challenges 
stemming from their lack of charitable, or in some cases any, legal 
status in China. 
1. Capacity 
One consequence of lacking legal status, raised by numerous 
interviewees, is that operators must transact leases, banking, and 
employment in their personal capacity.  This often results in sub-
standard banking and employment practices and exposes signatories 
to a legal liability, a cause for concern for many of the 
                                                                                                               
 87 Interview with Austin, Lawyer, New Grace, in Beijing, China (July 7, 2010). 
 88 See generally Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, The Origins and Social Consequences 
of China’s Hukou System, 139 CHINA Q. 644 (1994) (referring to hukou as an individual’s 
residency permit under the Chinese Household Registration System). 
 89 Interview with Will Peters, Founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
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interviewees—”It is problematic, but what can we do?  I have no 
idea how it might affect me”;90 “were an accident or something to 
happen, then we don’t have any protection.”91  Loving Embrace, 
which employs families in the community as primary caregivers 
rather than hired staff, acknowledged that this vulnerability extends 
to those volunteers; many potential foster families have declined to 
volunteer with Loving Embrace due to concerns about liability in 
the event of an accident.92  For foreigners, there is an associated risk 
of being asked to leave China. 
In terms of employment, the majority of interviewees 
employ staff (in some cases up to several hundred employees) by 
way of verbal agreement, or a simple written contract signed by an 
individual as employer in his or her personal capacity.  This makes 
it impossible to purchase social insurance for employees,93 which is 
problematic in rural areas where employees are unable to self-
insure.94  Such informal arrangements also mean that employees are 
not protected by the Labor Bureau’s oversight.  Instead, as China 
Orphan Relief explained, they are reliant on their employer’s 
goodwill: “What made it all work was trust—they trusted me—that 
I would treat them well and do the right thing.  This trust was built 
up over time, and especially through middle management. [Middle 
management] trusted me, and this was passed down.” 95 
2. Financial Practices 
Banking restrictions cause significant obstacles for all of the 
foster homes interviewed.  Those operating as non-entities are 
unable to open bank accounts in the name of the foster home, 
                                                                                                               
 90 Interview with Founder/Director, BICR, in Beijing, China (Aug. 27, 2009). 
 91 Interview with Co-founders/Managers, Mercy Home, in Beijing, China (July 25, 
2010). 
 92 Interview with Co-founders/Directors, Loving Embrace, in Shanghai, China (Oct. 8, 
2009). 
 93 The Labor Contract Law covers only employers that are “enterprises, individual 
economic organizations, private non-enterprise entities, or other organizations.” Laodong 
Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective January 1, 2008), art. 2, translated in 
http://www1.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6133 [https://perma.cc/P8YC-
4YC6]. 
 94 Interview with Will Peters, supra note 44; Interview with Alana, supra note 49; 
Interview with Alain, supra note 78. 
 95 Interview with Will Peters, Founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
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meaning that unrelated personal bank accounts must be used to 
receive donations.  This can cause transparency issues for 
international donors, who may feel uneasy about donating large 
sums of money to a personal account.  For Shooting Star, this was 
the main issue that prompted it to seek Foundation status.  As 
Shooting Star’s lawyer put it, the willingness of offshore donors to 
support the organization’s work depended entirely on its founder’s 
social capital, and “it would be very difficult for new charities to do 
what [she] did.” 96  Those homes using commercial representative 
office status are able to open accounts, but these are of limited 
utility as representative office bank accounts can only receive funds 
transferred from the bank account of the representative office parent 
company (which, as explained above, must be a commercial rather 
than a charitable foreign entity, although this rule has only recently 
begun to be enforced).97  Donations received domestically, or from 
a donor unable to donate to the jurisdiction of the parent company, 
must be channeled through a personal bank account, raising the 
same issues as for non-entities.98  Further, there are various daily 
and annual caps on personal bank account withdrawals; accordingly, 
many of the homes are forced to use multiple bank accounts, which 
have been opened by volunteers or friends for the purpose of 
channeling large operational budgets.  The use of personal accounts 
can also cause taxation and accounting difficulties for charities in 
other countries that collect donations to be channeled to China99 and 
erode the home’s legitimacy in the eyes of the state and potential 
donors: “We’ve been told finances are the most important thing, our 
vulnerability—we are scrupulous about keeping receipts and books, 
as if we are ever in trouble, that would be the first thing 
requested;” 100  “we are operating way below the international 
financial ethics standards.  So, it’s difficult to raise money in 
                                                                                                               
 96 Interview with Anthony, Legal Counsel, Shooting Star, in Beijing, China (Sept. 4, 
2009). 
 97 Interview with Alain, supra note 14; Interview with David, supra note 81; 
Interview with Will Peters, supra note 44. 
 98 Interview with David, Founder/Director, New Grace, in Beijing, China (Sept. 17, 
2009). 
 99 Interview with Will Peters, Founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
 100 Interview with Co-founders/Directors, Loving Embrace, in Shanghai, China (Oct. 8, 
2009). 
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China . . . We don’t like it, of course, but we don’t have a 
choice.”101 
Turning to taxation, most interviewees had difficulties 
understanding their liabilities under Chinese law.  An obvious 
advantage to operating as a non-entity is that no taxes are payable, 
in other words “it keeps us out of the tax spotlight.”102  The same is 
true of registered Foundations, which under general tax laws are 
“virtually tax exempt.”103  Commercial representative offices, on the 
other hand, are subject to local taxes on expenditure,104 although 
some of the commercially registered homes have successfully 
negotiated with their local tax offices for reduced rates or exemption, 
based on the charitable nature of their work.  Ashley and He point 
out that such negotiations entail risks, by “[drawing] into question 
the propriety of the organization’s registration as a commercial 
                                                                                                               
 101 Interview with Alain, Founder, Good News Training Centre, in Hebei, China (Aug. 
20, 2010). 
 102 Interview with Co-founders/Directors, Compassion, in Dongjian, China (Sep. 1, 
2009). 
 103 Ashley & He, supra note 30, at 50.  The law relating to Representative Offices of 
foreign NGOs is complex, but according to a 1996 policy issued by the State 
Administration of Taxation, non-profit institutions may apply for duty-free treatment.  
Guojia Shuiwu Zongju Guanyu Jiaqiang Waiguo Qiye Changzhu Daibiao Jigou Shuishou 
Zhengguan Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi (国家税务总局关于加强外国企业常驻代表机构
税收征管有关问题的通知) [State Administration Notice of Taxation on Strengthening the 
Tax Management of Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises] (issued by the St. 
Admin. of Tax., Sept. 13, 1996, effective Sept. 13, 1996) Guo Shui Fa (1996) No. 165, 
translated in http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=16516&lib=law [https://perma.cc/
KA2E-BZST].  For example, in 2004 the (central) State Administration of Taxation 
approved exemption for thirty-three permanent Representative Offices of foreign 
enterprises, including the Ford Foundation and U.K. Care for Children Ltd. following 
applications to the Beijing Local Taxation Bureau.  Guojia Shuiwu Zongju Guanyu 
Meiguo Fute Jijinhui Beijing Banshi Chudeng 33 Jia Waiguo Qiye Changzhu Daibiao 
Jigou Mianshui Wenti de Pifu (国家税务总局关于美国福特基金会北京办事处等 33家
外国企业常驻代表机构免税问题的批复) [Reply of State Administration of Taxation on 
Tax Exemption of 33 Permanent Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises, such as 
Beijing Representative Office of Ford Foundation] (issued by the St. Admin. of Tax., June 
11, 2004, effective June 11, 2004) Guo Shui Han (2004) No. 777, translated in 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=55391&lib=law [https://perma.cc/P973-BQW9]. 
The process of securing such tax exemption can be described as “opaque.” Ashley & He, 
supra note 30, at 75. 
 104 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Guanyu Guanli Waiguo Qiye 
Changzhu Daibiao Jigou De Zanxing Guiding (中华人民共和国国务院关于管理外国企
业常驻代表机构的暂行规定) [Interim Provisions of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China on Administration of Resident Representative Offices of Foreign 
Enterprises] (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct. 30, 1980, effective Oct. 30, 1980), art. 9 
(China). 
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enterprise in the first place.”105  Given the informal nature of these 
negotiations, New Grace also expressed concern that the taxation 
authorities could potentially decide in the future to demand payment 
of back-taxes, a bill that could potentially amount to millions of 
Chinese RMB due to New Grace’s large operating budget. 
3. Transparency and Good Governance 
There are numerous safeguards in Chinese law against 
substandard NGO practices, such as internal governance and 
financial management standards, annual MCA inspections, and 
information disclosure requirements.106   However, these safeguards 
do not apply to unregistered or commercially registered 
organizations, such as the foreign foster homes.  Generally, the 
foster homes have excellent administrative capabilities, and all were 
able to explain in detail good governance practices aimed at 
fulfilling a self-imposed and self-regulated duty of accountability 
towards donors and supporters.  Many expressed concerns that 
changing the status quo and being more closely associated with 
government would impinge on the freedom they currently 
experience outside of the formal NGO legal framework. However, 
David Dale of New Grace was an exception: 
The danger is there’s no defined system or standard 
of care, even in the state orphanages.  So, you end up 
with everyone doing what everyone thinks is right or 
best. And you have to ask yourself—are we really 
caring for the children well enough?  I think we are.  
                                                                                                               
 105 Ashley and He, supra note 30, at 59. 
 106 See, e.g., Jijinhui Niandu Jiancha Banfa (基金会年度检查办法) [Measures for 
Annual Inspection of Foundations] (promulgated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Jan. 12, 2006, effective Jan. 12, 2006) 
(China); Jijinhui Xinxi Gongbu Banfa (基金会信息公布办法 ) [Measures for the 
Information Disclosure of Foundations] (promulgated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
MCA, Jan. 12, 2006, effective Jan. 12, 2006) (China); Cishan Fa (慈善法) [Charity Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2016, effective, Sept. 
1, 2016), translated in http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=21807&lib=law [https://perma.
cc/D7SD-K4Y8]. 
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But that’s just our judgment.  That judgment should 
really be made by government, not us.107 
The potential for deviant cases is an unavoidable risk of 
allowing unregulated care to flourish—although admittedly not one 
that is necessarily mitigated by increased government supervisory 
powers. 
4. Legality for Legality’s Sake 
Finally, many of the interviewees spoke of “legality” as 
something that would not only be pragmatically helpful, but also as 
something ideologically valuable, of intrinsic or perhaps moral 
worth.  Despite being used to the contradiction in China between 
formal and informal rules, and fairly comfortable operating in what 
they refer to as a “grey area” between lawful and unlawful, tolerated 
and not tolerated, many interviewees still regarded “legal” as a 
status to be aspired to, and seemed to perceive a connection between 
law, justice and morality.  On the other hand, the foster homes were 
also very frank in describing their work in general as “illegal” and 
open about the loopholes and back doors they need to use in order to 
be able to circumvent legal restrictions.  Lawfulness was generally 
seen as worth pursuing but only insofar as its pursuit does not 
conflict with the higher moral norm that sick children must be cared 
for no matter the legal restrictions on doing so: “We’re all doing this 
work illegally.  We can’t think of legalities, because if we do, the 
children would have died . . . We do understand, we know we can’t 
do this legally, but morally we have to do it;” 108  “we love the 
children.  The children are my work.  Government stuff is not my 
concern . . . Legal or not legal is fine for me;”109 “we know our 
cause is worthwhile, so we’re willing to act illegally.”110 
                                                                                                               
 107 Interview with David, Founder/Director, New Grace, in Beijing, China (Sep. 17, 
2009). 
 108 Interview with Volunteer Coordinator, Rice Rescue, in Anhui, China (Oct. 4, 2009). 
 109 Interview with Founder, Friendship Outreach, in Dongjian, China (Aug. 28, 2009). 
 110 Interview with Will Peters, Founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
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V. DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA’S “LONELY 
CHILDREN” 
1. The “Chilling Effect”—Lack of Advocacy 
It is difficult to assess the impact of the negotiated, extra-
legal regulation of the foreign foster home sector.  On the one hand, 
the homes have collectively been able to provide high quality care 
and improved adoption prospects for many thousands of vulnerable 
children in China, and many are involved in impactful adoption 
advocacy in “receiving” countries, such as the United States.  On 
the other hand, the willingness and capacity of foreign actors to try 
to influence state law and policy within China on issues such as 
abandonment, quality of institutional care and adoption seems to 
have been stifled by their lack of legal security.  This “chilling 
effect” of ambiguous regulatory policy has been described aptly by 
Ashley and He in relation to unregistered NGOs more generally: 
[T]he ambiguous legal status and resultant 
irregularities stemming from these organizations’ ad 
hoc arrangements serves as an effective 
governmental tool to keep organizations in check in 
certain respects—namely, it keeps them in fear of the 
government’s selective enforcement of registration, 
accounting and other requirements that they are 
forced to bend . . . Knowledge of their own 
vulnerability . . . in turn makes NGOs hesitant to 
wade into questionable political waters.  Ambiguity 
creates a chilling effect—a cheap and powerful 
regulatory tool.111 
The prevailing strategy of foreigners involved in foster care 
is to lie low and not risk incurring the ire of the state by drawing 
attention to shortcomings in Chinese child welfare or the more 
general issue of child abandonment (a phenomenon the Chinese 
government has a vested interest in underemphasizing due to its 
                                                                                                               
 111 Ashley & He, supra note 30, at 80. 
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nexus with controversial birth planning policies).112  For example, 
there is a notable lack of collaboration among the homes or between 
the homes and state agencies in terms of advocacy for reforms to 
child welfare policies, legalization of foreign foster homes, or 
upstream measures aimed at preventing abandonment.  It is also 
notable that this group of charities, despite being dominated by 
religiously motivated individuals and organizations, on the whole 
avoids a politicized evangelical agenda. 
Whether or not this trend of self-censorship and lack of 
momentum in terms of advocacy is an intended or incidental effect 
of the (informal) norms and relationships in the field, the result is a 
social sphere in which any expansion, growth or impact on other 
spheres—such as policy, cultural attitudes to charity and the 
disabled, and religious/foreign-driven mission—is cautious at best.  
This feature is noted by researchers in relation to grassroots NGOs 
more generally.  Lu’s fieldwork on Chinese NGOs found 
“widespread pessimism (or realism) about what they can achieve 
through their actions;”113  Ashley and He similarly argue that “one 
defines one’s goals within the limits of what seems possible” and 
that “legal ambiguity combined with China’s political climate seems 
to have shaped the overall agenda of China’s grassroots NGOs to 
favor politically safe fields and politically prudent approaches.”114  
For foreign foster home operators, this prudence takes the form of 
an overwhelming emphasis on service rather than advocacy, and a 
lack of mutually supportive networks with defined policy agendas 
within the sector. 
2. The “Axe Over the Head”—Challenges for Growth and 
Continuity 
Whether this regulatory landscape has been deliberately 
shaped or not, it allows China to maintain the fiction that only China 
cares for Chinese children, while also allowing private organizations 
to assist in orphan relief, a task in which local governments are 
                                                                                                               
 112 See generally KAY ANN JOHNSON, CHINA’S HIDDEN CHILDREN: ABANDONMENT, 
ADOPTION, AND THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE ONE-CHILD POLICY (2016) (describing the 
negative impact of China’s one-child policy on Chinese families). 
 113 Yiyi Lu, NGOs in China: Development Dynamics and Challenges, in CHINA’S 
OPENING SOCIETY: THE NON-STATE SECTOR AND GOVERNANCE 89, 98 (Zheng Yongning & 
Joseph Fewsmith eds., 2008). 
 114 Ashley & He, supra note 30, at 83. 
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apparently overwhelmed.  Further, such private charities can be 
unofficially but closely monitored and controlled by the shadow of 
state power and formal law.  Will Peters described it thus: “The 
government wants to have its cake and eat it too—it wants to let 
NGOs function in China, without legitimizing them, but while 
keeping control over them. They are walking a tightrope.”115  The 
lawyer for Shooting Star hypothesized that the “one eye open, one 
eye closed” approach is “sort of part of the policy-making process in 
China—a new trend emerges in practice, which is beyond the law—
the government allows them to do it, to see how it goes.  If it goes 
well, then they adopt it by writing it into law.”116  Austin of New 
Grace similarly characterized the ambiguity of the field as 
intentional, at least at the local level.  He explained the government 
approach to private foster homes using the analogy of a parent 
adopting a curfew but consistently allowing their teenager to arrive 
home slightly past the set time but within reason, according to an 
unspoken flexibility.  But “it’s very sensitive.  They don’t want to 
be seen as doing that.”117  The director of Good News similarly 
speculated, in reference to local orphanage officials: “They are O.K. 
with being in the gray—it gives them the control to go either 
way.”118  This viewpoint echoes that of Liu, who in reference to the 
regulation of Chinese charities generally finds that: 
[D]ue to institutional reasons, many activities which 
should be carried out according to legally prescribed 
rules are instead carried out according to some 
underlying “hidden” rules.  Gradually these hidden 
rules replace the legally prescribed rules to become 
commonly accepted rules, thereby further twisting 
the already problematic system, and increasing the 
difficulties in institutional reform and standardization 
of social administration.119 
                                                                                                               
 115 Interview with Will Peters, founder/CEO of China Orphan Relief, in Beijing (Aug. 
25, 2009). 
 116 Interview with Anthony, Legal Counsel, Shooting Star, in Beijing, China (Sept. 4, 
2009). 
 117 Interview with Austin, Lawyer, New Grace, in Beijing, China (Sept. 5, 2009). 
 118 Interview with Alain, Founder, Good News Training Centre, in Hebei, China (Aug. 
24, 2009). 
 119 Liu, supra note 22, at 89. 
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The hidden rules that characterize state-society relations in 
the field have significant ramifications for the growth of the sector.  
It seems that so long as those rules are respected, much can be 
achieved outside the legal framework.  As Keyser points out, 
although the ambiguous legality of foreign NGOs causes difficulties, 
“the very vagueness in the law on the protection of children as well 
as the ability to operate at the local level has also created 
opportunities.”120   Established foster homes, whose operators are 
astute to the political climate in which they work and have built up a 
network of protective connections and experience over many years, 
are able to take advantage of the flexible regulatory environment to 
carry out work that benefits thousands of children. 
However, both political acumen and a strong personal 
motivation are needed to persevere in the face of the many 
operational hurdles, discussed above, facing the quasi-legal foster 
homes: “There’s an intangible hassle factor—we have to dance 
around all these hoops.  It’s a quiet sucking away of energy.”121  
Further, interviewees were also aware of their vulnerability to 
unforeseen changes and events (“local attitudes to enforcement vary 
as suits their local needs”)122 and at times expressed frustration with 
the vague, capricious and negotiated nature of their interactions with 
the state: “I live between lines that are moving constantly—it’s a 
moving target.  What is acceptable one day is not O.K. the next.  
You don’t know where the line is so it’s easy to cross it.”123  Even 
Austin, who described the social rules as “predictable to an extent.  
They’re based on past practice,” on the other hand also admitted 
that “there is no guarantee that [practice] will continue like that. . . . 
It’s grace and favor, it’s not law.”124  The interviewees were all very 
aware, when pushed on the sustainability of their work, of their 
overall vulnerability to being shut down at any time without notice 
should circumstances change, something described as a constant 
“axe over the head,” stating: “All of us could be stopped at any time 
                                                                                                               
 120 Keyser, supra note 6, at 62. 
 121 Interview with CEO, Prince of Peace, in Meihua, China (Sep. 1, 2009). 
 122 Interview with Anthony, Legal Counsel, Shooting Star, in Beijing, China (Sept. 4, 
2009). 
 123 Interview with Alana, Founder/Director, Red Thread, in Shaanxi, China (Sep. 27, 
2009). 
 124 Interview with Austin, Lawyer, New Grace, in Beijing, China (Sep. 5, 2009). 
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from doing what we’re doing;” 125  “registration would mean we 
could work more smoothly and feel safer if the officials we deal 
with are replaced by people with different ideas.”126  Some have 
intentionally adopted a transient model of care with this in mind, 
and Prince of Peace and Mustard Seed are both pursuing a long-
term strategy of handover to Chinese leadership.  In all, there was a 
prevailing sense that vulnerability is an inevitable aspect of working 
in a contentious and unregulated field; foreigners in the field 
understand that their work is tolerated and permitted for the time 
being, within fairly narrow parameters, but generally put much more 
confidence in divine protection (“We trust God.  Sometimes there’s 
not an earthly explanation, there just isn’t”) 127  than in the 
predictability of the Chinese state: 
This is the most frustrating feeling in China—you’re 
never one hundred percent safe or on solid ground.  
This project, it’s big, it’s good, we’ve put so much 
into it.  But in a week they could bring us down.  But 
that’s also the beauty of China!  Nothing is radical 
here.  There’s always room for negotiating.128 
VI. CONCLUSION 
“Most of what we’ve accomplished could never have 
been done in our home country.  And ten years from 
now it may be impossible because the government is 
just beginning to understand its responsibility to 
control NGOs.”129 
This study has contributed to our understanding of state-
society relations in China’s non-profit sector, demonstrating various 
and overlapping modes of interaction with state authorities that 
                                                                                                               
 125 Interview with Co-founders/Directors, Loving Embrace, in Shanghai, China (Oct. 8, 
2009). 
 126 Interview with Co-founders/Directors, Mothers’ Arms, in Shanghai, China (Oct. 8, 
2009). 
 127 Interview with Co-managers, Prince of Peace, in Meihua, China (July 29, 2010). 
 128 Interview with Alain, Founder, Good News Training Centre, in Hebei, China (Aug. 
24, 2009). 
 129 Interview with Co-founders/Directors, Loving Embrace, in Shanghai, China (Oct. 8, 
2009). 
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range from symbiotic relationships of mutuality to examples of 
repression and antagonism.  These processes, of circumventing or 
coping with state disapprobation, or negotiating state tolerance or 
support, were overwhelmingly occurring with lower level officials, 
and usually evolving at a very gradual rate towards greater security 
and openness over long periods of time.  Generally, to use an 
analogy raised by one interviewee in the broader study, the homes 
were gradually trending over many years from “red” to “yellow” to 
“green” in terms of permissibility.  Only a small number of homes 
have attained a formal “green light,”130 and all of these reached such 
formalization only after many years of operating in the “red” or 
“yellow” zones.  Where such formal recognition was present, 
interaction with the state was generally occurring at a more senior 
level of government bureaucracy.  Those who have endured in the 
field are astute and sensitive to the different pressures and 
considerations at play on the part of the state.  They are careful to 
avoid certain behaviors, most notably anything that could raise red 
flags in the eyes of the state about evangelistic intentions or loss of 
face.  They have a clear understanding of which lines must not be 
crossed and which lines can be pushed and manipulated over time.  
They have adapted to a system in which flexible norms, rather than 
formal laws, govern individualized, paternalistic relations with the 
local state, and in which social and political legitimacy carries more 
weight than legality. 
Foster home operators are also balancing their mission and 
calling with state restrictions: “I’ll do this until you shut me down or 
don’t let me do it the way I want to do it . . . I want to look after 
children, and I’m happy to play by the rules, spoken and unspoken, 
as long as it suits me.”131  Those state restrictions look likely to 
increase with the passing of the new Foreign NGO Management 
Law, effective January 1, 2017.132  The law requires overseas NGOs 
that are active in China (this would include U.S.-registered charities 
and foundations that fund projects in China) to find an official 
Chinese sponsor and register with the Ministry of Public Security.133  
                                                                                                               
 130 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 131 Interview with Will Peters, Founder/CEO, China Orphan Relief, in Beijing, China 
(Aug. 25, 2009). 
132 Foreign NGO Management Law, supra note 29.  See generally, Wong, supra note 
29 (describing increased legal restrictions on foreign organizations operating in China). 
 133 Foreign NGO Management Law, supra note 29, art. 6, 11. 
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It also gives the police broad search, seizure, and detention powers 
over organizations that receive foreign funding.134  Given that most 
of the foreign foster homes are dependent on donations channeled 
through foreign charities, the law appears to formalize police 
oversight of the sector.  Perhaps more worrying is the underlying 
spirit of the law, which indicates winds of deep skepticism and 
suspicion towards foreign civil society are once again blowing from 
Beijing.135  The tension previously noted by Keyser, as to how and 
when foreign non-profits can be registered in China,136 seems to 
have been resolved, at least on paper, in favor of authoritarian 
restrictions and high hurdles to foreign non-profit activity.  It seems 
likely that in this newly emerging political climate, the proven 
ability of foreigners in the foster home field to navigate shifting 
norms and cultivate social and political legitimacy in the face of 
restrictive formal laws, will be more important than ever to their 
survival and to the fate of China’s lonely children. 
VII. APPENDIX A: PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES 
Participants from a total of twenty-four different 
grassroots/non-state orphan care providers were interviewed as part 
of the broader research project.  These providers are roughly 
categorized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Orphan-Related NGOs by Activity 
 
Description No. of 
Interviewees 
Chinese-run orphanage 7 
Chinese-run orphanage support 
organization 
1 
Chinese-run foster home 2 
Foreign-run foster home 14 
Total 24 
 
                                                                                                               
 134 Id. ch. V, VI. 
 135 Wong, supra note 29. 
 136 Keyser, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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Interviews were also conducted with a number of child-
related NGOs, both foreign and Chinese, with primary content 
covering NGO laws, policies and practice, registration procedures, 
and issues relating to Chinese civil society more generally; a retired 
senior level Ministry of Civil Affairs137 official; and the following 
government and government-owned departments and entities: the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs China Charity and Donation Information 
Center, 138  the Shandong Charity Federation Office, 139  and the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs NGO Service Center.140 
VIII. APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY NOTES 
In conducting interviews and undertaking data analysis, I 
adopted the method for socio-legal studies set out by Professor 
Denis Galligan in Law in Modern Society, and in particular the first 
three of the four methodological principles, which are described as 
follows: 
[F]irst identifying and describing features of a legal 
order that can be identified as relevant to the actions 
of citizens and officials, . . .  secondly, examining the 
meanings attributed to such features by citizens and 
officials, and the actions that follow . . . [thirdly,] 
focusing on the character of social spheres and their 
interaction with law[, fourthly,] positioning law in a 
moral context [and connecting it to] its pragmatic 
foundations.141 
When it comes to mapping the relevant features of the field 
of study, a number of issues were faced.  First, using networks and 
                                                                                                               
 137 The Ministry of Civil Affairs (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzheng Bu) is the 
administrative authority responsible, inter alia, for welfare programs. 
 138 Interview with Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzhengbu Zhongmin Cishan 
Juanzhu Xiaoxi Zhongxin (中华人民共和国民政部中民慈善捐助消息中心) [Ministry of 
Civil Affairs China Charity and Donation Information Center], in Beijing, China (Sept. 8, 
2009) (on file with author). 
 139 Interview with Shandong Sheng Cishan Zonghui (山东省慈善总会) [Shandong 
Charity Federation Office], in Jinan, Shangdong Province, China (Sept. 21, 2009). 
 140 Telephone interview with Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzhengbu Minjian 
Zuzhi Fuwu Zhongxin (中华人民共和国民政部民间组织服务中心) [Ministry of Civil 
Affairs NGO Service Center] (Sept. 18, 2009). 
 141 DENIS GALLIGAN, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 34–38 (2007). 
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word of mouth to contact interviewees leads to a set of case studies 
more likely to constitute a social network, and, from a positive 
science perspective, less representative of all actors involved in 
private orphan work.  However, Small argues that, beyond the 
often-overlooked point that even supposedly “random” samples are 
almost inevitably characterized by bias problems, “bias” is the 
wrong term or standard of assessment when it comes to in-depth 
interviews.  The set of cases, as a result of being “selected” based on 
personal contacts and informal introductions, will as a group have 
particular characteristics—the most obvious being their willingness 
to speak to me—but these are characteristics that, in the words of 
Small, “rather than being ‘controlled away’, should be understood, 
developed and incorporated into [one’s] understanding of the cases 
at hand.”142 
The next set of factors are related.  First, there are obvious 
difficulties faced by an ‘outsider’ seeking to observe and enquire 
about sensitive work being carried out on the margins of legality.  
Second, given the opacity of government policy and practice in 
relation to such a sphere of activity, the bulk of ethnographic data 
collected is necessarily derived from interviews with private 
operators in the field rather than informants from the government.  
Given the intersection of up to three politically controversial aspects 
to my case studies—quasi-legal/unregistered, church-associated, 
orphan-directed charities—attempts to speak to local officials, or 
requests for my informants to put me in touch with such officials, 
were largely fruitless.  Thus, the primary data presented herein 
emphasizes the civil, as opposed to state, perspective of law, order, 
and regulation in the field.  Third, selecting which elements and 
observations to be used to construct a narrative of the field required 
“mastering the elements of the drama;” as Bates et al note, narrative, 
like dramas, “can be elusive; many possible explanations can exist, 
and many possible interpretations.” 143   These three factors are 
accommodated by the methodological framework within which the 
data was collected and analyzed.  Rooted in socio-legal analysis, the 
theoretical task of an interpretive/reflexive, as compared to 
positivist approach, is to seek to uncover meanings and patterns in 
                                                                                                               
 142 Mario Luis Small, How Many Cases Do I Need?: On Science and the Logic of 
Case Selection in Field-Based Research, 10(1) ETHNOGRAPHY 5, 14 (2009). 
 143 ROBERT BATES ET AL., ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 14 (1998). 
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the field of social activity by an exploratory interpretation of 
institutions and behaviors, rather than a descriptive measurement 
thereof.  Thus, a “thick description,”144 or narrative of a field of 
activity, can be constructed, and the questions of interest reflexively 
refined in the process.  By seeking, in this way, to situate the field of 
social activity within its broader context, and having regard for the 
meanings constructed by those in the field itself, richer 
interpretations can be drawn, including as to government behavior 
and intention, and accounting for the impact of my presence as an 
observer and outsider in the field.  These theoretical extrapolations 
benefit from a coping strategy I adopted very early on, when the 
opacity of activity in this realm became apparent, namely, to 
increase the number of field sites and thus reduce the impact of a 
lack of local bureaucratic cooperation in any particular site.  
Knowledge gained in particularly “data-rich” locations, such as 
Dongjian (an area previously home to dozens of foreign foster 
homes, and the “homeland” of China’s foreign foster home 
movement since the 1980s), informed and contextualized behaviors, 
norms, and relationships observable in other locations where 
informants were fewer or seemed to be less transparent about their 
work and experiences.145 
This framework borrows extensively from the “extended 
case method” approach espoused by Michael Burawoy.146  Burawoy 
characterizes his approach as a type of reflexive science, which 
“takes as its premise the inter-subjectivity of scientist and subject of 
study,” as compared to positive science which “works on the 
principle of the separation between scientists and the subjects they 
examine.”147  The starting point of reflexive science is to admit that 
the impact of the researcher’s presence in the field, the personal 
preferences and interpretations which she brings to bear when 
selecting data, and the resultant ambiguous nature of such data 
reporting decisions, all violate positive science prescriptive tenets of, 
respectively, the injunction against reactivity, reliability, and 
                                                                                                               
 144 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES, 5–6, 9–10 (1973). 
 145 For a discussion of multi-site case studies, see Maria Heimer, Field Sites, Research 
Design and Type of Findings, in DOING FIELDWORK IN CHINA (Maria Heimer & Stig 
Thøgersen eds., 2006) (explaining the similarities and differences in a multi-site study). 
 146 Michael Burawoy, The Extended Case Method, 16(1) SOC. THEORY 4 (1998); Small, 
supra note 142. 
 147 Burawoy, supra note 146, at 4. 
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replicability.  However, rather than seeking to artificially mitigate 
against such processes resulting from the researcher’s presence, 
Burawoy seeks to include and account for such processes.   
Thus, throughout my fieldwork, I remained mindful of the 
perturbations created by my presence and by the knowledge, on the 
part of informants, of my agenda, and have paid close attention to 
“non-discursive . . . unexplicated, tacit knowledge“ 148  underlying 
my interactions in the field.  For example, one “positive 
perturbation” existed on account of my having a religious 
background and beliefs in common with almost all interviewees, 
discussions about which would regularly led to noticeable openness 
on the part of my informants.  Such discussions also often led to 
more expansive discourse about other “laws” and normative forces, 
felt and acted upon by them, but which would not have been 
immediately obvious from a secular or rational-legal perspective.  
On the other hand, in some interviews I felt that I was received 
primarily as a Westerner and outsider, which resulted in a 
corresponding non-discursive posture, on the part of Chinese 
interviewees, of defensiveness or impenetrability.  By regarding and 
reflecting on the effect of such perturbations, I was better able to 
derive legitimate and defensible interpretations and analyses of my 
interviews and observations in the field. 
 
                                                                                                               
 148 Burawoy, supra note 146, at 4. 
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